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ABSTRACT
For a variety of reasons, vaccines and other critical pharmaceutical
products have become increasinglyscarce in the lastfew years, andpersistent
shortages involving dozens of essential drugs may imperil the public health.
Pressures emanatingfrom regulatoryagencies, the courts, and insurers have
conspired to make some lines of the pharmaceutical business less than
attractive.Although concerns about unpredictable tort liability received most
of the blame in the past, two otherfactors may help to accountfor the latest
round of drug shortages: stringentfederal controlofmanufacturingfacilities
and aggressive cost-containment efforts that further erode profit margins.
Whatever the cause, scarce supplies necessitate efforts at rationingthatpose
their own difficulties for health care providers. Policymakers could avoid
putting physicians to such tough choices regardingpatients by focusing on
ways to ensure the production of adequate quantities of these highly costeffective medical technologies. Some commentators have called for greater
public sector involvement, but this Article concludes that, in addition to
bolstering its emergency stockpiles, the federal government instead needs to
take steps designed to encourageprivate manufacturers to continue supplying
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critical pharmaceuticals. To this end, the government should adopt more
flexible regulationsgoverningmanufacturingfacilities,provide companieswith
greater protection from the vagaries of tort liability, and avoid pursuing
excessive cost-control strategies. Otherwise, patients may continue to lose
access to importanttherapeuticproducts.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the still mysterious mailing
of weaponized anthrax spores one month later, awakened this country to the
risks of bioterrorism and brought attention to what has become a growing
problem: shortages of antibiotics, vaccines, and other medical technologies.'
Although this situation poses concerns about our readiness in the event of a
bioterrorist attack, it has more mundane and potentially serious public health
implications. In addition, while it should come as no great surprise that we have
inadequate supplies of treatments for smallpox and anthrax, persistent shortages
of common childhood vaccines and other critical pharmaceuticals seem
inexplicable.
A recent front page story in the Washington Posthighlighted the problem:
"Shots designed to protect children against eight of [eleven] vaccinepreventable infections have been intermittently in short supply everywhere in
the United States since last summer. Some will remain hard to get for at least
another six months." 2 The affected products include a couple of long-used
combination vaccines-one to protect against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis
(DTP), and another one to protect against measles, mumps, and rubella
(MMR)-along with two newer vaccines-one to protect against pneumonia
and one to protect against varicella (chickenpox).' Although the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have taken interim steps to respond to
these temporary supply problems, "physicians are viewing the shortages as an
extremely ominous development. Many find it appalling that this could happen
in a country that spends more on health care per capita than any other on

1. See Rick Weiss, Bioterrorism: An Even More DevastatingThreat, WASH. POST, Sept.
17, 2001, at A24; see also Raymond J. Baxter et al., Is the US.Public Health System Readyfor
Bioterrorism? An Assessment of the US. Public Health Infrastructure and its Capacityfor
Infectious Disease Surveillance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 1, 18 (2001) ("While
bolstering the nation's supply of vaccines and pharmaceuticals is important, it is even more
critical to shore up the public health infrastructure .... ).
2. David Brown, Severe Vaccine Shortages Termed "Unprecedented," WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 2002, at Al.
3. See id. The DTP vaccine sometimes is designated as "DTaP" to reflect a recent shift to
an acellular version of the pertussis component, while the combined tetanus and diphtheria
toxoids are designated as "Td" when supplied without the pertussis vaccine component (for
instance as a booster shot administered to adults). The shortages eased a few months later. See
Liz F. Kay, Vaccine Shortage Over, CDCSays,L.A. TIMES, July 12,2002, at A9. Butsee Robert
Pear, States Ration Low Supplies of 5 Vaccinesfor Children,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,2002, at A20
(discussing continued vulnerability of nation's vaccine supply).
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Earth."4 Dozens of other essential pharmaceutical products also have run low
in the last couple of years, including the anticoagulant heparin; the antiviral
drug ganciclovir; several antiemetics, diuretics, antiepileptic agents, and
injectable corticosteroids; and neuromuscular blocking agents.'
This sort of thing has happened before. In the mid-1980s, manufacturers
of pediatric vaccines dramatically increased the prices of their products or left
the market altogether. As the California Supreme Court recounted fifteen years
ago:
There are only two manufacturers of the [DTP] vaccine
remaining in the market, and the cost of each dose rose a
hundredfold from 11 cents in 1982 to $11.40 in 1986, $8 of
which was for an insurance reserve. The price increase
roughly paralleled an increase in the number of lawsuits from
one in 1978 to 219 in 1985.6

4. Brown, supra note 2, at Al. "'This is unprecedented,' said Walter A. Orenstein, a
physician who directs the [CDC's] National Immunization Program .... 'I have never seen
anything like the supply problems with this many vaccines in the 24 years I've worked in
immunization."' 1d.; see also Robert Pear, Shortage ofJuvenile Vaccines WorriesDoctors and
Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at A38 (concerning shortages in the production and supply
of childhood vaccines).
5. See Am. Soc'y of Health-Sys. Pharmacists, Drug Product Shortages Management
Resource Center, at http:/www.ashp.org/shortage (last visited May 23, 2002) (providing
extensive list of drug shortages); Donna Young, Drug Shortages Frustrate Health Care
Providers,59 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 698, 698 (2002) ("Three months into 2002, FDA
had identified 8 'medically necessary' drug products, not including vaccines, as being in short
supply and 11 other products . . . as having limited distribution."); Victoria Stagg Elliott,
Changes Sought to Combat Drug, Vaccine Shortages, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 24/31, 2001, at 1,
http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_.01/hI 121224.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002)
(describing shortages of several critical pharmaceuticals); Sabin Russell, Critical Vaccines,
Medicine Run Low, Tetanus Shots Rationed,CongressProbes Shortages, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 10,
2002 ("There is a growing uneasiness about the volume and frequency of drug supply
shortfalls.") at Al, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=chronicle/archive/
2002/02/10/MN20265.DTL (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). In the mid- 1990s, supplies of fertility
drugs ran short. See Tamar Nordenburg, Drug Supply Restored, FDA CONSUMER, Jan.-Feb. 1997,
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/1997/197_fert.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2002).
6. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470,479 (Cal. 1988) (citing Gina Kolata, Litigation
Causes Huge PriceIncreasesin Childhood Vaccines, 232 SCIENCE 1339 (1986)). "One producer
of [the DTP] vaccine withdrew from the market, giving as its reason 'extreme liability exposure,
cost of litigation and the difficulty of continuing to obtain adequate insurance."' Id. (quoting
Vaccine Injury Comparison: Hearing Before Subcom. on Health and the Env't ofHouse Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 295 (1984)); see also Kolata, supra, at 1339 (stating the
cost of the DPT vaccine is rising due to increased litigation); Marjorie Sun, The Vexing Problems
of Vaccine Compensation, 227 SCIENCE 1012, 1012 (1985) (reporting spot shortages of
whooping cough vaccine); Philip M. Boffey, Vaccine Liability Threatens Supplies, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 1984, at CI (describing Wyeth Laboratories' withdrawal from market due to litigation
and liability costs); Stephen Engelberg, Maker of Vaccine Quits the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

12, 1984, at A21 (describing Connaught Laboratories' withdrawal from market due to litigation
and high insurance costs).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 371

Although concerns about unpredictable tort liability provided the primary
impetus behind these developments, other factors contributed to the fear of
shortages at the time.7 In 1986, Congress responded to these developments and
passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.8 The Act helped to stabilize
the pediatric vaccine market, but supply problems persist, and experts in the
field continue to debate different mechanisms for reducing the threat of future
shortages. 9

Fortunately, past supply interruptions have involved vaccines produced by
more than a single company,"0 but "several vaccines now have only one
licensed producer."'" With the shrinking number of companies manufacturing
pediatric vaccines, supplies have become more vulnerable:
Given the increased concentration of vaccine producers
licensed by the United States, the complexity of the
manufacturing processes, and the time-consuming procedures
for licensing new production facilities, a serious incident,
such as a fire, at a single production facility could disrupt
U.S. supplies of some vaccines for months if not years. Any
such disruption could rapidly affect public health ....
12
7. See FederalChildhoodImmunization Program: HearingBefore the House Subcomm.
on Health and the Env 't,
99th Cong. 70 (Comm. Print 1986) (letter from Gov. Michael N. Caste,
Mar. 6, 1986, focusing on liability concerns, but also noting that one manufacturer had
experienced production problems); INST. OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 11, 85-119
(1985); Georges Peter, Editorial, Vaccine Crisis: An Emerging Societal Problem, 151 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 981 (1985) (discussing the "problem of complacency").
8. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755-56 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1
to -34 (2000)); see also infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., David C. Mowery & Violaine Mitchell, Improving the Reliability ofthe U.S.

Vaccine Supply: An Evaluation of Alternatives, 20 J. HEALTH POL.,

POL'Y

& L. 973 (1995)

(suggesting improvements in supply and tracking data, Food and Drug Administration
emergency procedures, stockpiling, and support from the National Institute of Health).
10. See id. at 997 ("Interruptions in the supply of U.S. vaccines have been fairly common
during the past decade ....The effect of these interruptions on U.S. vaccine availability has
been limited, however, partly because the most frequent supply interruptions have occurred in
a product [DTP] for which there are five licensed U.S. producers."); see also id. at 984
("Although several (two public and two private sector) domestic sources supply the combined
[DTP] vaccine, several recent interruptions occurred in the DTP vaccine supply.").
11. Id. at 980; see also id. at 984 ("Both the oral polio vaccine (OPV) and the combination
[MMR] vaccine have only one U.S.-licensed supplier ...");
id. at 997 ("[T]he trends toward
increased producer concentration increase the likelihood that the number of single-source
vaccines on the recommended childhood immunization schedule will increase."); Brown, supra
note 2, at Al ("(O]nly a handful of U.S. companies still make vaccines. A generation ago, there
were about 20 producers .... There's been nothing short of a stampede away from the
business.").
12. Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 975; see also id. at 988 ("Although U.S. singlesource vaccine suppliers have avoided production interruptions, there is little reason to discount
this possibility in the future. Policies to encourage the development of additional sources of
supply therefore merit consideration."); id. at 997 ("If interruptions in the production of OPV or
MMR, which are produced by a single U.S. supplier, were comparably frequent [to past DTP

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss2/5
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In the fall of 2001 something like that happened-the only manufacturer of the
MMR and varicella vaccines shut down its sole production facility for a couple
of months for scheduled maintenance and upgrades, resulting in spot shortages
of these two products. 3 Earlier that year, one of the last remaining domestic
suppliers of the DTP vaccine announced that it would cease production rather
4
than invest in upgrades to its production facility, leaving only a pair of
manufacturers headquartered overseas scrambling to meet the additional
demand to supply the market. 5
Usually, short supplies of drugs do not increase the risks to patient health
because effective therapeutic substitutes remain available, but occasionally
these shortfalls do endanger patients. 16 Vaccine shortages can interfere with
mass immunization efforts 7 and, with time, could threaten to unravel some of
the remarkable gains made against infectious diseases during the last halfcentury.' Even when substitute vaccines exist, they may represent older
supply interruptions], the public health risks would be substantially greater."); Jonathan Bor,
Shortages Hamper Children's Vaccination, BALT. SUN, Mar. 23, 2002, at IA ("[P]roduction
problems at any one factory can cripple the nation's supply.").
13. See Brown, supra note 2, at A l (describing production problems caused by repairs and
upgrades undertaken at Merck's vaccine plant).
14. See id. ("A competitor is working on a vaccine that would combine DTaP with polio
and hepatitis B vaccines, potentially making Wyeth's product obsolete. Spending money on a
plant to keep making the old vaccine was simply viewed as not worth it.").
15. See id. ("The current troubles began with the announcement by the pharmaceutical
company Wyeth Lederle in January 2001 that it would stop making vaccines containing tetanus
and diphtheria components.... Only one company, Aventis Pasteur, [now] makes Td, and only
two, Aventis and Glaxo SmithKline, make DTaP. Although each is boosting production, they've
been unable to meet demand.").
16. See Melody Petersen, Drug Shortages Become a Worry at Hospitals Around the
Country, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2001, at AI (concerning shortages of pitocin and flu vaccine and
possible public health consequences).
17. Mowery and Mitchell noted the possible effects on immunization efforts:
A "brief" supply interruption, that is one lasting fewer than six months,
need not immediately increase the burden of vaccine-preventable diseases,
although this is a concern in urban areas. Several cohorts would have to
miss being immunized before an increased incidence of disease would be
noticed. Nevertheless, catching up with the cohorts that missed key
immunizations would be difficult and costly.
Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 985; see also CDC, General Recommendations on
Immunization, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. RR-2 (2002) (describing the
process of large-scale vaccinations); CDC, National State, and Urban Area Vaccination
Coverage Levels Among Children Aged 19-35 Months-United States, 2000, 50 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 637,641 (2001) ("[S]hould vaccine-preventable diseases be introduced
into low coverage geographic areas, the accumulation of susceptible persons might serve as a
reservoir to disseminate disease.").
18. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7 (1986) ("[T]he withdrawal of even a single vaccine
manufacturer would represent the very real possibility of vaccine shortages, and, in turn,
increasing numbers of unimmunized children, and, perhaps, a resurgence of preventable
diseases."), reprintedin National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6348; Heikki Peltola, What Would Happen If We Stopped Vaccination?, 356 LANCET 22
(Supp. 1 2000) (estimating that the United States would experience more than 1,000 deaths
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formulations that offer somewhat reduced safety, efficacy, or convenience. 9
Similarly, patients who depend on a particular medication to treat a chronic
health condition may suffer if they are unable to secure supplies.20 In addition,
alternative suppliers can introduce separate safety concerns. For instance, when
the manufacturer of betamethasone experienced quality control problems and
halted production temporarily, physicians and hospitals in one region of the
country requested a local pharmacy to compound this injectable corticosteroid
from available bulk materials. 2' The product became contaminated and resulted
in two deaths and dozens of patient injuries.22
What accounts for this state of affairs, and how, if at all, should the
government respond? Part II of this Article considers some of the causes of
recent shortages, including stringent federal regulation of manufacturing
facilities and cost-containment efforts that create downward pressure on prices,
as well as some of the public health consequences. Whatever the explanation
for scarce supplies, they place patient welfare at risk and present difficult
rationing choices for health care providers. Part III of this Article turns to some
of the possible remedies, including enhanced protection from tort liability,
improved government stockpiles, and compulsory licensing or public sector
manufacturing, before concluding that policymakers need to focus on reducing,
rather than further increasing, the economic disincentives against supplying
needed vaccines and other drugs.

annually if vaccinations against measles and Hib ceased); see also E.J. Gangarosa et al., Impact
of Anti- Vaccine Movements on Pertussis Control: The Untold Story, 351 LANCET 356, 360
(1998) (discussing the incidence ofpertussis' positive correlation with low DTP coverage); Julie
Appleby & Anita Manning, Stockpiles Tapped as Supplies of Vaccines Run Short, USA TODAY,

Feb. 18, 2002, at lB (referring to "an outbreak in 1989-91 that led to 55,000 measles cases,

11,000 hospitalizations and 123 deaths"); Jane E. Brody, For the Vaccine-Wary, a Lesson in
History, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, at F8 (describing pertussis epidemics in England and Japan,

which resulted in dozens of deaths, after immunization rates plummeted in the mid-1970s).

19. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 984 ("[A]n interruption in the U.S. supply of

either MMR or OPV could force changes in the immunization schedule, perhaps including a shift
to the inactivated polio vaccine or, with MMR, a return to use of single antigens.").
20. See Shari Roan, Longtime Drug'sNew Troubles: Synthroid, Taken by 8 Million People
with Thyroid Problems, Is Under FDA Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at S1 (discussing

FDA mandated cuts of Synthroid); see also Chris Adams, FDA Weighs Requests to Return
Lotronex to Consumer Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2001, at B 10 (discussing possible return
of Cotronex despite safety concerns because of consumer demands); Denise Grady, FDA Pulls
a Drug, and PatientsDespair,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, at Fl (describing the withdrawal of

the irritable bowel syndrome drug Lotronex); Marc Kaufman, Panel Suggests Irritable-Bowel
Drug Be Sold Again, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2002, at A7 (describing how former users of
Lotronex lobbied FDA to reinstate it so they could "resume normal lives").
21. See Fred Gebhart,FatalMeningitisLinked to Compoundingby Calif.Pharmacy,DRUG
Topics, July 2, 2001, at 32.
22. Id.
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II. DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM
For a variety of reasons, shortages of pharmaceuticals have become
increasingly common.23 In some cases, a shortage results because of problems
with either the supply of raw materials or the manufacture of the finished drug
product. For example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) shut down
BioPort Corporation (the sole manufacturer of an experimental anthrax
vaccine) for several years because of quality control problems.24 Recently, a
nationwide recall triggered by evidence of product contamination created a
serious shortage of anti-venin used to treat snakebite victims.25 The FDA
should, of course, protect patients from risks associated with defective
therapeutic products, but if the regulatory infractions pose no immediate health
threat, then the FDA also must remember the consequences of decisions to
interrupt manufacturing by sole suppliers of critical pharmaceuticals.
Apart from manufacturing problems, drug shortages can arise from
deliberate decisions by pharmaceutical companies to cease or drastically reduce
production because of declining profits. Compounds that have lost their patent
protection typically command far lower prices, and manufacturers often prefer
to focus on a newer product designed to replace its predecessor and generate
more substantial revenues. In 1997, in an effort to minimize the short-term
supply disruptions caused by corporate decisions to cease marketing critical
pharmaceuticals, Congress mandated that sole suppliers of such products notify
the FDA at least six months ahead of time so the agency could alert physician
and patient organizations. 26 In implementing this provision, the FDA devoted

23.

See U.S. GEN.

ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

No. GAO-02-987, CHILDHOOD VACCINES:
14-19 (2002) [hereinafter

ENSURING AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY POSES CONTINUING CHALLENGES

GAO]; Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("There's no single cause behind the shortages. Instead,
they've arisen from a combination of business decisions, bad luck and greater than expected
demand for the vaccines."); Charles Ornstein & Charles Piller, US. Plagued by Chronic
Shortage of Key Vaccines, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al (discussing "chronic difficulties"
in vaccine production).
24. See Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Anthrax as a Biological Weapon, 2002: Updated
Recommendationsfor Management, 287 JAMA 2236, 2244 (2002); Keith Bradsher, The Only
U.S. Laboratoryfor the Anthrax Vaccine Says Production Will Be Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2001, at B7; Guy Gugliotta, No Decision on Anthrax Vaccine Program: Pentagon Weighs
Military, Civilian Needs Against Limited Supply Says Its "Close" to Resolving Issue, WASH.
POST,

May 20, 2002, at A2.

25. See Charles Rabin, Low Supplies of Antivenin Heighten Snakebite Danger,MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 28, 2002, at 3B. A few years earlier, concerns about viral contamination of raw
materials coupled with unanticipated demand created shortages of intravenous immunoglobulin.
See CDC, Availability of Immune Globulin Intravenousfor Treatment of Immune Deficient
Patients-UnitedStates, 1997-1998,48 MORBIDITY &MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 159, 159 (1999)
(discussing increased distribution of immunoglobulin intravenous (IGIV) after shortage of
November 1997).
26. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 131,
111 Stat. 2332(1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356c (2000)); 65 Fed. Reg. 66,665 (proposedNov.
7, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.81(b)(3)(iii), 314.91); see also id. at 66,669
(estimating that this would happen only once a year on average).
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a section of its official website to the subject that tracks problems with the
supplies of particular drugs and offers recommendations to the health care
community.27
This Part elaborates on some of the causes of inadequate supplies of critical
pharmaceutical products as well as the consequences of such shortages.
Although tort liability received most of the blame in the past, two other factors
may help to account for the latest round of shortages: stringent federal control
of manufacturing facilities and cost-containment efforts that erode profit
margins. Whatever the cause, scarce supplies necessitate efforts at rationing
that pose their own difficulties for health care providers and their patients.
Instead of making tough microallocational judgments involving these highly
cost-effective medical technologies, such artificial shortages must be avoided
in the first place.
A. Backdoor "DrugLag"
In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to
strengthen the premarket approval requirements applicable to new drugs,
forcing sponsors to provide proof of effectiveness as well as safety.28 Over the
years, critics have blamed the FDA's lengthy and demanding approval process
for creating a "drug lag" that delays pharmaceutical products already approved
in Europe and elsewhere from entering the United States market.2
Commentators have paid far less attention to the other changes wrought by the
1962 amendments, such as the requirement that sponsors comply with good

27.

See Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, Drug Shortages, at

http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/shortages (last visited May 22, 2002). The CDC may also
disseminate such information. See, e.g., CDC, Decreased Availability of Pneumococcal
Conjugate Vaccine, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 783, 784 (2001) (describing
shortages due to delays in delivery ofPrevnar); CDC, Shortage ofSpectinomycin-UnitedStates,

50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 470 (2001) (announcing shortage of spectinomycin);
see also CDC, PotentialShortage ofSupplemental Test Kitsfor DetectingHIV-1 Antibodies, 51

MORBIDITY& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 395,395-96 (2002) (describing delays in obtaining HIV-1
western blot kits used for confirming presence of HIV antibodies in blood obtained "from either
patients or blood and plasma donors").
28. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781,76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)); see also LARS NOAH & BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS 198-219 (2002) (discussing the FDA's new drug
approval requirements).
29. See H.R. Doc. NO. 80-64 (1980); HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE
REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS (1983); Robert W.

Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits ofRegulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J.
ON REG. 233,276-77 (1991); Richard A. Merrill, The Architectureof Government Regulation of
MedicalProducts, 82 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1753-55, 1788-89 (1996) (citations omitted); Barry S.
Roberts & David Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962:
Regulatory Failure,1982 ARz. ST. L.J. 581.
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manufacturing practices (GMPs).3 ° Just as rigorous premarket review has both
positive and negative effects, the careful control of manufacturing processes is
not an unalloyed good.
In recent years, the FDA has improved the speed with which it approves
new drugs.31 However, in the process it has diverted attention from other
regulatory tasks. For instance, as it focuses increasingly on reviewing
applications for product approval, the FDA may invest fewer resources in
periodic inspections.32 This can result in greater-though perhaps largely
undetected-industry noncompliance with GMP requirements.33 When
problems eventually come to light, the agency may temporarily halt further
sales of a manufacturer's drugs.34 In addition, when sponsors apply for
supplemental new drug approval to manufacture a previously approved product

30. See 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) (2000); 21 C.F.R. pts. 210-211 (2001); Nat'l Ass'n of
Pharm. Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 879 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding the agency's authority to
adopt binding GMP rules); United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Various Articles of
Device Consisting in Whole or in Part of Proplast II or Proplast HA, 800 F. Supp. 499,502 (S.D.
Tex. 1992) (holding government need not prove actual deficiency as a result of GMP violation);
Nat'l Ass'n Pharm. Mfrs. v. HHS, 586 F. Supp. 740, 748-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting
numerous substantive and procedural challenges to the FDA's!GMP regulations).
31. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO/PEMD-96-1, FDA DRUG APPROVAL:
REVIEW TIME HAS DECREASED INRECENT YEARS (1995) (finding "a considerable reduction
approval time for [new drug applications] submitted between 1987 and 1992); David A.Kessler
et al., Approval of New Drugs in the United States: Comparison with the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Japan, 276 JAMA 1826, 1829-31 (1996); Deborah G. Parver, Comment,
Expediting the Drug ApprovalProcess: An Analysis of the FDA ModernizationAct of1997, 51
ADMIN. L. REv. 1249, 1266 (1999); Chris Adams & Scott Hensley, DrugMakers Want FDA to
Move Quicker, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2002, at B12 (noting major improvements by FDA in
median review times of applications).
32. See Margaret Gilhooley, The Administrative Conference and the ProgressofFoodand
Drug Reform, 30 ARiz. ST. L.J. 129, 141 (1998) (noting FDA cut resources for food and other
programs); Bruce N. Kuhlik, Industry Funding of Improvements in the FDA 's New Drug
Approval Process: The PrescriptionDrug UserFee Act of] 992, 47 FOOD& DRUG L.J. 483, 500
(1992) (explaining that user fees cannot be utilized by the FDA to finance compliance
monitoring activities); Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions: HarnessingExperiential
Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 449, 462-66, 494-95 (2000) (noting
"increased burden" on "past approval safety review mechanisms" and monitoring processes).
The FDA has decided to accept, on a reciprocal basis, inspections of overseas drug
manufacturing facilities conducted by its regulatory counterparts among members of the
European Union. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 26(A) (2001); see also id. § 26.4(b) (excluding biologics);
GAO, supra note 23, at 23 (suggesting flexibility in case of vaccine shortages).
33. See GAO, supra note 23, at 15-16; Mary K. Olson, Agency Rulemaking, Political
Influences, Regulation, and Industry Compliance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 573, 591-93 (1999)
(discussing increased industry noncompliance related to decreased inspections); Mary Olson,
Substitution in RegulatoryAgencies: FDA EnforcementAlternatives, 12J.L.ECON. & ORG. 376,
377-79, 383-84, 387 (1996) (discussing FDA choice of less expensive recalls over costly
inspections and monitoring).
34. See John D. Copanos & Sons, Inc. v. FDA, 854 F.2d 510, 514-18, 522-26 (D.C. Cir.
1988); United States v. Barr Lab., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 458, 464,487-91 (D.N.J. 1993).
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in a new facility, insufficient resources available for conducting inspections
may cause delays. a5
Vaccine manufacturers must satisfy not only new drug approval
requirements but also a separate set of controls governing biologics,36 although
recent amendments to the regulations have reduced some of these burdensome
requirements. 3 Vaccines require more complex manufacturing facilities and
longer production lead times than other pharmaceutical products,38 and the
FDA imposes particularly rigorous GMP requirements on biologics.3 9 For

35. See infra note 43; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(vi) (2001) (describing
supplemental approval process). When the agency cites a company for GMP violations, it may
prompt compliance by delaying final approval of pending applications for any new drugs slated
for manufacturing at the allegedly substandard facilities. See David Barr, The Changing
Approval Process: PreapprovalInspection, 47 FOOD& DRUG L.J. 359, 361 (1992) (discussing
elements of approval for new drug applications); Merrill, supra note 29, at 1787 (noting GMP
inspection as precondition for drug approval); Melody Petersen, Faults Found at a Schering
Plant,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at C3 (noting no FDA drug approval until producer remedied
manufacturing problems).

36. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2000); Center for Biologics Evaluation & Research, FDA,
Vaccine ProductApprovalProcess,at http://www.fda.gov/cber/vaccine/vacappr.htm (last visited
May 28, 2002); William David Hardin, Poliomyelitis Vaccine-History Regulations and
Recommendations, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 145, 151-55 (1985); Mowery & Mitchell, supra
note 9, at 986 ("FDA regulation of vaccines is considerably more stringent than regulation of
other pharmaceuticals, because it places greater demands on licensing production facilities and
monitoring individual batches of vaccines."). The agency had issued monographs setting out
standards for vaccines, see 21 C.F.R. pts. 620, 630 (1995), but it subsequently decided to repeal
these as obsolete, see Revocation of Certain Regulations; Biological Products, 61 Fed. Reg.
40,153 (Aug. 1, 1996). The FDA continued to review vaccines licensed by the NIH before the
transfer of this responsibility to the FDA in 1972. See 65 Fed. Reg. 31,003 (proposed May 15,
2000).
37. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,441,56,441-42, 56,450-52 (Oct. 20, 1999) (codified in 21 C.F.R.
pts. 600, 601 (2001)) (amending the regulations to replace separate applications for product and
establishment licensing with a single biologics license application (BLA)); Elimination of
Establishment License Application for Specified Biotechnology and Specified Synthetic
Biological Products, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,227,24,232-33 (May 14, 1996) (codified in 21 C.F.R. pts.
600, 601 (2001)) (amending the regulations to exempt "well-characterized biotechnology
products" from separate establishment licensing application requirement). In 1997, Congress
directed the Secretary of Heath and Human Services to minimize the differences in product
approval requirements applied to drugs and biologics. See Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 123(f), 111 Stat. 2296, 2324.
38. See Brown, supranote 2, at Al ("Vaccines are also hard to make. They're derived from
bacteria and viruses, which are trickier to handle than inert chemicals. Many require elaborate
processing to keep them safe, uncontaminated but still active. It takes Aventis Pasteur almost a
year to make a batch of Td."); see also Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 984-85 ("The
effects ofvaccine supply interruptions are exacerbated by limited industry inventories. Vaccines
have a short shelf life (an average of two years) .

. .

.

[Elven under the most urgent

circumstances, a large emergency vaccine order requires several weeks to process.").
39. See 21 C.F.R. pts. 600-610(2001); PETERBARTONHUTr&RICHARDA.MERRILL, FOOD
AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 664 (2d ed. 1991) ("Once the specific plant has been
approved, . . . it is more difficult to secure approval of an alternative manufacturing site for a
biological than for a new drug."); Gary E. Gamerman, Regulation ofBiologics Manufacturing:
Questioning the Premise,49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213 (1994) (criticizing the FDA's continued
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instance, the agency demands that preapproval clinical trials use batches
produced in a commercial-scale manufacturing facility,4 ° which means that
once those facilities actually begin producing biologics for the market, they
may use methods that no longer represent the state of the art. 41The FDA allows
a limited exception for products that are "in short supply, 42 but the stringency
of GMP requirements applicable to drugs and especially biologics still
represents a potential obstacle to
the uninterrupted supply of therapeutic
43
products approved for marketing.
B. Cost ContainmentBackfires
The federal government buys substantial quantities of prescription drugs
for use in a variety of programs. By virtue of its sheer size, the government can
negotiate for favorable prices, at least if it coordinates its purchases."4 In
addition, state governments have become more active in trying to use their

insistence on more intensive scrutiny of manufacturing for biological products as compared to
drugs); Edward L. Korwek, Human BiologicalDrugRegulation: Past,Present,andBeyond the
Year 2000,50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 123, 132-34 (Supp. 1995) (discussing stringency of regulation
of biologics compared to other products); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-28(a) (2000) (imposing
special recordkeeping and reporting requirements on manufacturers of childhood vaccines);
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 540-47 (1988) (holding the FDA lacks discretion to
release lot of noncompliant vaccine).
40. NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202,206 (D.N.J. 1994); see Gary
B. Ebbert et al., Overview of Vaccine Manufacturingand Quality Assurance, in VACCINES 40,
41 (Stanley A. Plotkin & Walter A. Orenstein eds., 3d ed. 1999); Mowery & Mitchell, supra note
9, at 986-87; Paul D. Parkman & M. Carolyn Hardegree, Regulation and Testing of Vaccines,
in VACCINES, supra, at 1131, 1136-37.
41. See Gamerman, supra note 39, at 231 (explaining that a biologics manufacturer
"face[s] the problem of having to build and staff a facility that will not be state-of-the-art by the
time it is needed for full production and distribution"); id. at 231-32 n.98 ("[A] manufacturer of
a sub-unit vaccine was required to repeat its preclinical and Phase I studies completely when it
switched to a purification scheme that permitted greater product yield, purity, homogeneity, and
stability.").
42. 21 C.F.R. § 601.22 (2001); cf Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 987 (noting that
"this provision is rarely invoked by U.S.-licensed producers of vaccines").
43. See Brown, supra note 2, at AI ("As with the making of drugs, vaccine production is
heavily regulated by the [FDA], and companies must periodically spend large amounts ofmoney
on plant improvements to meet the FDA's requirements. Many complain that they can't recoup
their investment through sales."); Scott Gottlieb, Getting Drugs Made Can Be Harder Than
Creating Them, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan 14, 2002, at 19, 22, http://www.ama-assn.org/scipubs/amnews/pick_02/bica01 14.htm (describing the lack of adequate manufacturing facilities
for monoclonal antibodies such as Enbrel, and blaming the problem on slow and expensive FDA
inspections).
44. See Shankar Vedantam, HHS's Varying Costsfor Cipro Criticized,WASH. POST, Oct.
26, 2001, at A16 (reporting that the government negotiated a contract to purchase an antibiotic
for the treatment of anthrax for 950 per dose-far less than the retail price of over $4 and the
manufacturer's original offer of $1.83 but more than twice the price paid by the federal
government under a preexisting program).
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leverage to limit expenditures on pharmaceuticals.45 Public and private insurers
are more likely to reimburse or supply pharmaceuticals regarded as essential
to health, but the desire to guarantee patient access unwittingly may weaken the
industry's economic incentives for producing adequate supplies of these
therapeutic agents. Bulk purchases by government agencies or pressures
exerted by large insurers can depress prices to the point that it makes little
business sense for continued manufacturing of a particular product.
Vaccines do not represent a terribly lucrative business compared to other
pharmaceutical lines." Indeed, their success in eradicating dreaded infectious
diseases of the past creates a risk of eventual obsolescence, as happened with
the smallpox vaccine until very recently. Government-mandated immunizations
for children ensure a steady demand for many vaccines. However, in contrast
to prevalent chronic diseases that require daily and indefinite use, individuals
receive a particular vaccine on just a few occasions over the course of their
lifetimes.47 To make matters worse, many individuals do not purchase vaccines,
relying instead on supplies made available by public health departments.48
In 1993, Congress created the Childhood Immunization Initiative, which
ensured free vaccines to all eligible children. 49 This statute directed the CDC

45. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 222-26 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (invalidating the federal government's waiver ofcertain Medicaid requirements applicable
to Vermont's program); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66,71-72,8485 (1st Cir. 2001) (refusing to enjoin Maine's program), cert. granted,122 S. Ct. 2657 (2002);
Francis B. Palumbo, The Role ofthe State as a Drug Purchaser,56 FOOD &DRUG L.J. 267,27680 (2001). Governments in other countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, play an
even more central role in drug purchasing.
46.
[V]accines historically have been high-volume, low-profit items
in drug companies' catalogues. This is still true of older
vaccines .... Only the newer, still-under-patent products such

as the chickenpox vaccine ($39 a dose, at the government
discounted price) and the pneumococcal vaccine ($46) offer the
kind of profit margins pharmaceutical companies are
accustomed to.
See Brown, supranote 2, at A 1."[T]he field generally isn't viewed as a money-maker. Vaccines
account for only 1.5 percent of the global pharmaceutical market." Id.
47. Brown notes in his article:
Among the economic disincentives is the fact that vaccines are given on a
rigid schedule and only occasionally-far different from products such as
antidepressants and cholesterol-lowering drugs, which are taken for years
and whose 'target' populations are constantly expanding. Moreover,
vaccine hazards stand out starkly in populations in which the diseases the
vaccines prevent are no longer visible.
Id.; see also Terence Chea, Vaccines Are Hot Topic, but Not Hot Investment, WASH. POST, Dec.
13, 2001, at El ("The drug industry would rather develop pills that people take every day for
years than a vaccine taken once in a lifetime.").
48. See Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("[Bjecause the federal government buys so much,
discount pricing is the rule, not the exception, in the vaccine market.").
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(a)(1)(A) (2000); see also Walter A. Orenstein et al., Public
Health Considerations-United States, in VACCINES, supra note 40, at 1006, 1013
("Approximately 60% of vaccines routinely recommended for children are purchased with public
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to increase the purchasing of pediatric vaccines, but limited price increases on
government contracts to the rate of inflation.5" However, these and other efforts
to secure deep discounts or otherwise control prices could backfire by
"accelerat[ing] the exit of U.S. producers from the industry, further reducing
the number of suppliers of critical vaccines."5 ' One might understand the
problem as the flipside of rationing expensive health care interventions: if
government efforts to ensure inexpensive access for patients sufficiently
depresses prices, manufacturers may no longer bother to produce the product
or may devote fewer resources to it than more lucrative lines of business.52
That, in turn, creates scarcity. Along similar lines, declining insurance
reimbursements for mammograms, which may no longer cover the cost of
performing this diagnostic test, have caused several mammography centers to
close their doors.53

funds through federal contracts negotiated by the CDC with the vaccine manufacturers.... The
typical discount has been approximately 50% off the published catalog prices.").
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(d)(3)(B).
51. Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 984; see also id. at 980 n.8 (The statute "may well
cause established U.S. vaccine producers to focus future development efforts on vaccines for
adults rather than for children."); Ira Carnahan, Duh!: The Government Cut the Price of
Vaccines. Now It's Hard to Find Them, FORBES, Mar. 18, 2002, at 50 (discussing vaccine
shortages due to lack ofparticipation by drug companies in government programs). Conversely,
the assured demand and government-run distribution network may help stabilize the market and
perhaps attract new entrants. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 988 ("[E]ntrants to the
vaccine industry now can reach a larger share of the U.S. market without an extensive
distribution and marketing network .. "); Kathleen Day, Vaccine Maker Gets a Shot in the
Arm, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1996, at F17 (noting that "federal and state government buy 60
percent of vaccines"); see also Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d
1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that the federal government pays for the price of the pertussis
vaccine); GAO, supra note 23, at 6 n.5 (noting that manufacturers of the Td booster vaccine
refuse to sell it to the CDC at the capped price).
52. See Barry R. Bloom, The United States Needs a National Vaccine Authority, 265
SCIENCE 1378, 1378 (1994) (conceding that the public "interest is best served by multiple
manufacturers and competition, not by monopsonistic or universal government purchase"); see
also Patricia M. Danzon & Li-Wei Chao, Does Regulation Drive out Competition in
PharmaceuticalMarkets?, 43 J.L. & ECON. 311,319 (2000) ("The lower the originator product's
price when the patent expires, the lower the potential profit margin for a generic competitor
pursuing a price competition strategy, and hence the less attractive is the market for competitive
generic entry."); Jerry Stanton, Comment, Lesson for the United States from Foreign Price
Controls on Pharmaceuticals,16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 167-71 (2000) (discussing diminished
R&D levels in insecure profit environments); Vanessa Fuhrmans & Gautam Naik, DrugMakers
Fight to Fend Off Cuts in European Prices, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002, at AI (reporting that
companies may "withhold innovative new treatments from European markets" if governments
there insist on unprofitable pricing).
53. See Barbara Martinez, Screening Crunch: As More Women SeekMammograms, Many
Have to Wait Months, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at Al (discussing "feud" between health care
workers and insurers over reimbursements).
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In the field of organ transplantation, federal and state statutes prohibit the

sale of most human tissues,54 which several commentators have criticized given
the serious scarcity of donated organs. 5 The prohibition on commercialization
represents an extreme cost-containment measure used by governments to
ensure affordable drugs, and it may similarly create scarcity. 6 Imagine that the

government prohibited drug manufacturers from generating any profit on the
sales of vaccines and other critical pharmaceuticals, allowing them to recoup
only their expenses for raw materials and counting on their corporate altruism
to continue supplying the market. Although members of the pharmaceutical
industry participate in a variety of charitable activities,57 altruism alone will not
maintain product lines that generate little or no profit.58
54. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000) (federal prohibition of organ purchases); see also
Susan H. Denise, Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1022-32
(1985) (discussing the origins of this prohibition and parallel state legislation).
55. Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, The Economics and Ethics of Alternative
Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 403, 408-10 (1991); Deborah
Josefson, AMA Considers Whether to Payfor Donation of Organs, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1541
(2002); Susan Okie, Surgeons Back Study of Payment for Organs: PlanAimed at Boosting
Donor Rates, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2002, at A3; Shelby E. Robinson, Comment, Organsfor
Sale? An Analysis ofProposedSystems for CompensatingOrganProviders,70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1019, 1030 (1999); cf.Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The
Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989) (advocating legalization of
commerce in organs).
56. See Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures
Market in Bodily Organs,55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 19, 76 (1994); see also James F. Blumstein, The
Use ofFinanciallncentivesin MedicalCare: The Caseof Commerce in TransplantableOrgans,
3 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 19 (1993) ("If people are not inclined to donate [organs], then that means
they will require more in the way of an inducement. Prospective buyers would have to raise the
price."); id. at 21-24 (distinguishing between supply-side and demand-side issues); Julia D.
Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REv. 163, 174-85, 192-200, 221 (2000)
(explaining that, even if donors act altruistically, other participants in the organ transplant
business do not).
57. See Theresa Agovino, Private Groups Subsidizing Medicinesfor World's Sick, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 17, 2002, at 8; Bruce Japsen, Abbott, Rivals Offer a Discount Drug Card, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 10, 2002, § 3, at 1 ("Abbott, for example, donated more than $40 million in
pharmaceutical products to 85,000 people free of charge last year under a patient assistance
program in place since 1996."); Seven Drug Companies Offer Discount Cardto Elderly, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at C3 ("Under its long-standing Patient Assistance Program,
Merck ...offers many of the company's medicines free of charge to any patient without
prescription drug coverage who has an annual individual income less than $18,000 ....
").
58. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Public Health Groups Act Like Companies in Bid to Fight
Diseases in PoorNations, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 2001, at B3 ("The same dilemma stands in the
way of investing in treatments for diseases caused by bioterrorism agents-the uncertain market
discourages private investment."); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Cosmetic Saves a Curefor Sleeping
Sickness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at At ("It has been known for more than 10 years that
eflornithine is a virtual miracle cure for trypanosomiasis, but stocks have run out because early
hopes that it would help fight cancer have been dashed and medical production has stopped.");
see also Justin Gillis, Drugmakers Step Forward in BioterrorFight: Free, Discounted Pills
Offered, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2001, at A18 (explaining public relations benefit and other
motivations behind company offers to provide free supplies of antibiotics against anthrax);
Charles Omstein, DrugFirmsRush to OfferFree Anthrax Antibiotics,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27,2001,
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C. RationingFinite Supplies
Vast literature exists about health care rationing, but it focuses almost
exclusively on scarcity of financial resources that requires trade-offs among
patients, choice of interventions, and other uses of the money."' Commentators
have paid relatively little attention to "microallocation" questions that arise
when, regardless of the ability to pay, there are not enough units of a health
care intervention to go around.6" The field of organ transplantation is the one
6
exception which actually poses both sets of rationing difficulties. " Given the

at A3 (same).
59. See HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION:
RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984); ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE (1988); PAUL T.
MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE (1990); Daniel Callahan,

TransformingMortality: Technology and the Allocation of Resources, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 205,
219-23 (1991); Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82. CAL. L. REv. 1449 (1994);
Mark A. Hall, RationingHealth Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1994); Symposium,

Caringforthe Uninsuredand Underinsured,265 JAMA 2441 (1991); Symposium, The Law and
Policy of Health Care Rationing: Models and Accountability, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1505 (1992).
60. See Maxwell J.MehIman, RationingExpensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 239, 244-45 ("Allocating medical treatments that are in short supply ... are
difficult and ethically troublesome. Generally, however, the options are circumscribed by the
available medical resources. The only question is who should receive them. Economists call this
a 'microallocation' problem." (footnotes omitted)). Professor Mehlman's article, like most others
that discuss health care rationing, addresses a different question:
The

current

debate . . . focuses on a different

type of

constraint-cost....
Under both cost-based rationing and technical or experimental
scarcity, microallocation decisions are needed to determine who receives
treatment. However, cost-based rationing entails additional decisions on
whether, and to what extent, to restrict the availability of treatment on
grounds of cost. These are termed "macroallocation" decisions.
Id. at 245; see also Roger W. Evans, Health Care Technology and the Inevitability ofResource
Allocation and Rationing Decisions, 249 JAMA 2047 (1983); David C. Hadorn & Robert H.
Brook, The Health Care Resource Allocation Debate: Defining Our Terms, 266 JAMA 3328,
3328 (1991) ("Only two types of medical and surgical services are currently scarce relative to
demand: organs for transplantation and, sometimes, beds in intensive care units.... Use of the
word rationing in the contemporary policy debate has clearly transcended [its] original
meaning." (endnotes omitted)); Michael D. Reagan, Health Care Rationing: What Does it
Mean?, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1149, 1150-51 (1988) (discussing heath care rationing policy).
61.

See RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SwAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN

AMERICAN SOCIETY 73-92 (1992); George J. Annas, The Prostitute,the Playboy,and the Poet:
RationingSchemes for Organ Transplantation,75 AM. J.PUB. HEALTH 187, 187-89 (1985); H.
Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Allocating Scarce Medical Resources and the Availability of Organ
Transplantation:Some MoralPresuppositions,311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 66, 69-70 (1984); Roger
W. Evans et al., The Potential Supply of Organ Donors: An Assessment of the Efficiency of
Organ ProcurementEfforts in the United States, 267 JAMA 239, 241-45 (1992); Richard A.
Rettig, The Politics of Organ Transplantation: A Parableof Our Time, 14 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 191, 191-92, 218-21 (1989); John A. Robertson, Supply andDistributionofHearts
for Transplantation: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Issues, 75 CIRCULATION 77, 86 (1987); H.
Gilbert Welch & Eric B. Larson, Dealing with Limited Resources: The Oregon Decision to
CurtailFundingforOrgan Transplantation,319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 171,171-73 (1988); see also
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high costs and sometimes poor chances of success associated with organ
transplantation, some have questioned whether this intervention represents a
sensible expenditure of scarce health care resources. If society answers that
macroallocational question in the affirmative, then, at least as long as shortages
persist, it becomes necessary to face the microallocational question and decide
which patients receive the available organs.
Microallocation problems pose particularly difficult choices.62 How does
one select among various patients when inadequate supplies prevent treating
all in need? The federal government has established an elaborate allocation
system for donated organs,63 but no similar framework exists for the rationing
of critical pharmaceuticals during shortages.64 One could distribute medications
on a first-come, first-served basis or some other random allocation system. In
1953, for instance, "the British Ministry of Health instituted a national lottery
in order to allocate the scarce supplies of polio vaccine."6 Half a century later,

David Mechanic, ProfessionalJudgmentand the RationingofMedical Care, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1713, 1752 (1992) ("The allocation of scarce resources, as in the case of organ transplantation,
is not prototypical of the majority of rationing decisions made within our vast health care
system ....These decisions detract attention from the far more numerous circumstances under
which more routine types of rationing occur.").
62. See JOHN F. KILNER, WHO LIVES? WHO DIES?: ETHICAL CRITERIA INPATIENT SELECTION
(1990); AMA, Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Ethical Considerationsin the Allocation
ofOrgansand OtherScarceMedicalResources Among Patients,155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
29, 35 (1995); James F. Childress, Triage in Neonatal Intensive Care: The Limitations of a
Metaphor, 69 VA. L. REV. 547 (1983) (discussing choices made as to which newborns receive
costly, but life-saving, neonatal intensive care); Volker H. Schmidt, Selection ofRecipientsfor
Donor Organs in TransplantMedicine, 23 J. MED. & PHIL. 50 (1998); Basil A. Stoll, Choosing
Between CancerPatients, 16 J.MED. ETHICS 71 (1990); Robert D. Truog, Triage in the ICU,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 1992, at 13; see also GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT,
TRAGIC CHOICES 182-90 (1978) (comparing different countries' approaches to allocating scarce
dialysis machines); K.M. Boyd & B.T. Potter, Prioritiesin the Allocation ofScarce Resources,
12 J. MED. ETHICS 197 (1986) (discussing a case involving competing needs for a single renal
dialysis machine).
63. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 274, 1320b-8 (2000); James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ
TransplantationPolicy: A Timefor Reassessment?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 451 (1989); Gail L.
Daubert, Note, Politics, Policies, and Problems with Organ Transplantation: Government
Regulation Needed to Ration Organs Equitably, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 459, 463-74 (1998)
(summarizing the central features of the federal allocation program). Recently, the federal
government issued controversial new rules that altered some of the allocation criteria. See Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296 (Apr. 2, 1998) (codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 121 (2001)); Laura E. McMullen, Comment, EquitableAllocation ofHuman Organs:
An Examination of the New FederalRegulation, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 405 (1999).
64. See Anthrax Attacks Leave States Little Better Prepared,USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2002, at
I OA ("With the possible exception of Colorado, no state has rules for rationing antibiotics or
vaccines when there are not enough to go around...."). A recently drafted model public health
law provides authority to ration critical pharmaceuticals and give precedence to health care
workers and disaster response personnel. See Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
§ 505(b), (c) (draft Dec. 21, 2001), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf
(last visited May 22, 2002).
65. GERALD R. WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE 147 (1982).
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initial shortages of a new treatment for hepatitis C required the establishment
of a special patient registration system. 66
Most rationing schemes emphasize relying solely on medical criteria, but
even these may point in different directions. Should the scarce resource go to
the sickest patient or the one most likely to recover if treated at an early stage?
When the vaccine against hepatitis B first became available, the combination
of limited supplies and high costs led to recommendations for its use only in
"high-risk groups."6 7 Nonetheless, the use of seemingly objective and neutral
medical criteria, even if such criteria could be established," may lead to
inequities in access.69 For example, researchers have found that minorities do
not respond as well to certain medications, perhaps because sponsors of
investigational new drugs rarely enroll patients from minority populations in
clinical trials.70
Although medical ethicists generally reject using social worth criteria,
should the patient's age or ability to pay factor into the choice? In recent years,
recurring shortages of the annual vaccines against influenza spurred
recommendations that otherwise healthy adults delay seeking inoculations to
ensure adequate doses for the elderly." In the face of concerns about shortages

66. See Geeta Anand, Schering-Ploughto Start Wait Listfor Hepatitis Drug,WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 16, 2002, at B14.
67. See 1 INST. OF MED., NEW VACCINE DEVELOPMENT: ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES 267-68
(1985); see also KILNER, supra note 62, at 124 ("An imminent-death criterion, for instance,
partly determined the distribution of insulin in the days when it was still scarce."). In the
transplantation context, one suggestion for responding to scarcity involves the salvage of
diseased or defective (so-called "extended criteria") organs for patients who otherwise would
receive a low priority because of their poor prognosis. See Paul Engstrom, "Marginal" Organs
Can Be Another Shot at Life, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2001, at S6.
68. See Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the HaphazardDiffusion of
Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 373 (2002) (discussing endemic
medical uncertainty); Lars Noah, Pigeonholinglllness: MedicalDiagnosisas a Legal Construct,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1999) (discussing the social construction of disease).
69. For instance, in the context of kidney transplantations, human leukocyte antigen (HLA)
matching improves success rates but results in serious distributional inequities for minority
patients who do not match the largely nonminority donor supply. See Ian Ayres et al., Unequal
RacialAccess to Kidney Transplantation,46 VAND. L. REV. 805, 815-36, 849-53 (1993); Robert
S. Gaston et al., Racial Equity in Renal Transplantation: The DisparateImpact ofHLA-Based
Allocation, 270 JAMA 1352, 1353-55 (1993); Barbara A. Noah, The Invisible Patient,2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 121, 127-28 (book review).
70. See Lars Noah, The Coming PharmacogenomicsRevolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit
Patients' Genetic Profiles,43 JURIMETRICS J. (forthcoming Mar. 2003) (manuscript at pt.III.A,
on file with author) (explaining that advances in pharmacogenetics may exacerbate these
discrepancies in the future). After the anthrax attacks, employees of the United States Postal
Service complained that they had received poorer treatment than Senate staffers and suggested
that it had something to do with their race and socioeconomic status. See All Things Considered,
Postal Workers Question Equality of Medical Treatment for the Poor, (Nat'l Public Radio
broadcast, Jan. 15, 2002), available at 2002 WL 3494675.
71.
See CDC, Delayed Influenza Vaccine Availability for 2001-02 Season and
Supplemental Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices,50
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 582, 583-84 (2001) (adding that priority also should be
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of the DTP vaccine in the mid- 1980s, the CDC recommended that pediatricians
delay administering booster shots.72 The CDC has taken similar steps to cope
with the latest round of shortages," depriving adults of tetanus shots.74
Finally, should purely medical criteria give way in the face of a national
emergency? During World War II, the inability to synthesize penicillin coupled
with a sudden surge in demand resulted in serious supply shortages and
required rationing to facilitate the war effort.75 At present, some controversy
exists about providing initial doses of scarce vaccines to public health and
emergency response officials.76
Rationing difficulties often arise because ofmacroallocational decisions or,
more typically, indecision. Aside from insuperable technological barriers, we
could avoid microallocation problems by devoting greater resources to securing

given to other high-risk individuals and health care workers); CDC, DelayedSupply ofInfluenza
Vaccine and Adjunct ACIP Influenza Vaccine Recommendationsfor the 2000-01 Influenza
Season,49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 619, 620-21 (2000). Physicians also reported
incidents of price gouging. See Elliott, supra note 5, at 2.

72.

See CDC, Diphtheria-Tetanus-PertussisVaccine Shortage-United States, 33

MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.REP. 695, 696 (1984); CDC, Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis
Vaccine Shortage, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 103, 104 (1985). The agency
rescinded its recommendation less than six months later after one of the manufacturers began

distributing supplies again. See CDC, Reinstatement ofRegular Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis
Vaccine Schedule, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 231, 232 (1985).
73. See CDC, Recommended ChildhoodImmunization Schedule-United States, 2002, 51
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 31, 33 (2002) ("As a result of the vaccine supply
shortage, deferral of some doses of tetanus and diphtheria toxoids (Td), diphtheria and tetanus
toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP), and pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) has
been recommended ....");CDC, Shortage of Varicella and Measles, Mumps and Rubella
Vaccines and Interim Recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices,51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.REP. 190, 190-91 (2002); Brown, supra note 2,
at Al ("[T]he CDC has been rationing supplies and changing immunization schedules to ensure
that all children get at least some doses of every vaccine they need.").
74. See CDC, Deferral ofRoutine BoosterDoses of Tetanus and Diphtheria Toxoidsfor
Adolescents and Adults, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 418 (2001); Geraldine M.
McQuillan et al., Serologic Immunity to Diphtheria and Tetanus in the United States, 136
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 660, 661, 664 (2002); Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("[T]he classic
'tetanus shot' people get when they have dirty wounds... isnow available only in emergency
rooms."); Andrea Petersen, VaccineShortage HitsAdults; Many Lack RequiredShots, WALL ST.
J., May 15, 2002, at D l ("Adults needing tetanus-diphtheria boosters-which they should get
every 10 years-will probably have to wait until the end of this year.").
75. See GLADYS L. HOBBY, PENICILLIN: MEETING THE CHALLENGE 141-45 (1985);
WINSLOW, supra note 65, at 7-8; Childress, supra note 62, at 551-52; Note, Scarce Medical
Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 664 n.241 (1969) (citing H.K. Beecher, Scarce Resources
and Medical Advancement, in ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS
280-81 (1969)).
76. See Ceci Connolly, Smallpox Vaccinationfor Medical Workers Proposed,WASH. POST,

Sept. 4, 2002, at A 1;Guy Gugliotta, Pentagon to Resume Anthrax Vaccinations: Those in "High
Threat" Areas Targeted, WASH. POST, June 29, 2002, at A3; see also USA TODAY, supra note
64 and accompanying text (discussing lack of state regulations for rationing antibiotics and
vaccines).
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adequate supplies." For the most part, vaccines and antibiotics do not represent
are among
expensive or exotic life-saving technologies. On the contrary, they
78 However,
the most cost-effective health care interventions available today.
their very success may have bred public complacency, and the resulting failure
to give sufficient priority to ensuring continued availability of these older
medical technologies may imperil the public health. In the case of rare diseases,
the federal government has extended special incentives designed to encourage
79
the development of so-called "orphan" drugs. Notwithstanding narrow patient
populations, a steady demand for certain orphan drugs coupled with generous
market exclusivity provisions have generated several commercially successful
products.8 Off-patent pediatric vaccines, antibiotics, and other critical
pharmaceuticals designed for occasional use by large patient populations may
represent the real orphans in need of additional protection.
III. STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE
In response to the latest round of vaccine shortages, interested parties have
8
begun serious efforts to find solutions. The previous discussion suggests a
77. See Mehlman, supra note 60, at 245 ("Assuming there is no technological or
experimental barrier to providing additional medical resources, availability is a function of cost.
Increasing the supply of these resources to avoid the need for rationing would require restrictions
on the supply of other resources .... ).
78. See CDC, Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children-UnitedStates,
1990-1998, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243, 244-45 (1999); Mark A. Miller &
Alan R. Hinman, Cost-Benefit and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Vaccine Policy,in VACCINES,
supra note 40, at 1074, 1085 ("Economic analyses of immunizations have shown them to be
among the best investments in health."); see also Carolyn Buxton Bridges et al., Effectiveness
and Cost-Benefit of Influenza Vaccination ofHealthy Working Adults, 284 JAMA 1655, 1661
(2000) (comparing the costs and benefits of vaccinating healthy adults); Craig C. White et al.,
Benefits, Risks and Costs of Immunization for Measles, Mumps and Rubella, 75 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 739, 739-40 (1985) (asserting that MMR immunizations are a cost effective method to
reduce mortality associated with measles, mumps, and rubella).
79. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2000)); see also Baker Norton Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 132 F. Supp.
2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 200 1) ("Since the passage of the Orphan Drug Act, the FDA has approved at
least 172 orphan drugs and biological products .. "); Carolyn H. Asbury, The Orphan Drug
Act: The First 7 Years, 265 JAMA 893 (1991) (exploring Orphan Drug Act's market exclusivity
provision and its cost effectiveness); Naomi Aoki, The Price ofSuccess: Orphan Drug Act Has
Spurred Advances-andDisputes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 2001, at F l (discussing Act's success
in encouraging companies to develop drugs to combat rare diseases).
80. See Peter S. Amo et al., Rare Diseases, DrugDevelopment, and AIDS: The Impact of
the Orphan Drug Act, 73 MILBANK Q. 231, 241-43 (1995); Ann Gibbons, Billion-Dollar
Orphans: Prescriptionfor Trouble, 248 SCIENCE 678 (1990); Abbey S. Meyers, The Impact of
Orphan Drug Regulation on Patients and Availability, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 9, 9-10 (1992);
Larry Thompson, The High Cost of Rare Diseases: When Patients Can't Afford to Buy
Lifesaving Drugs, WASH. POST, June 25, 1991, at Z10.
81. See GAO, supra note 23, at 24-34.
In recent months, there have been numerous meetings among
representatives of the federal government, public health departments, drug
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pair of responses. First, the FDA needs to facilitate rather than impede the
production of critical pharmaceuticals.82 The agency now does a better job of
getting essential drugs to the market, but it needs to help keep them on the
market as well. When it initially licenses products, the FDA gives priority to
reviewing drugs and biologics intended for the treatment of life-threatening
conditions for which effective therapies do not yet exist; 83 it needs to do the
same when it inspects facilities and resolves disputes involving GMP
requirements. At the very least, the FDA must demonstrate additional
flexibility in case of a serious supply shortage. 84 Second, cost-containment

companies and medical societies to try to come up with ways to avert
future shortages. Financial incentives to vaccine makers, changes in
regulation, bigger stockpiles and expanded liability protection are all being
considered.
Brown, supra note 2, at A1; James Collins, Senate PanelHears Callfor Action on Childhood
Vaccine Shortages; Stockpiling Is One Proposalas Health Officials, Doctors Express Concern,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 13, 2002, at All; Michael Tackett, Shortages a Threat to
Routine of Immunizations, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 2002, § 1, at 8; Editorial, Averting Vaccine
Disaster,WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2002, at A24.
82.
Expanding the role of either domestic or foreign biotechnology
vaccine firms in the U.S. vaccine industry must begin with an
effort to reduce the entry barriers associated with licensure in
the United States. Reduction in the stringency of regulation is
unlikely, but expanded collaboration between public biomedical
research agencies in the United States and foreign or domestic
firms in clinical trials and licensure could ease the licensing
barriers to entry.
Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 998; see also id. at 985 ("[T]he assessment of supply
interruption risk and policies to address this risk must look beyond the number of suppliers to
consider policies addressing vaccine stockpiles and FDA licensure of production facilities.");
cf. id. at 986 ("The very different product and process technologies associated with
vaccines ... prevent entry by 'generic vaccine' producers without extensive clinical trials.").
83. See 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2000); 21 C.F.R. pts. 314(H), 601(E) (2002). The FDA also
simplified the approval requirements for products designed to treat victims of bioterrorism. See
67 Fed. Reg. 37,988 (May 31, 2002).
84. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 985 ("[T]he duration of previous supply
interruptions is attributable in large part to the amount of time required by the FDA to license
a new production facility. In a crisis, these licensure procedures could be accelerated somewhat
without reducing their stringency or public safety."); see also Freddy A. Jimenez, Enforcement
ofthe Current Good ManufacturingPracticesfor Solid OralDosageForms After United States
v. Barr Laboratories, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67, 71-72 (1997) (discussing a consent decree that
enjoined production of Warner-Lambert drugs pending the completion of GMP audits, but
allowed continued production of "medically necessary" drugs-meaning those without a
therapeutic substitute-pending certification of the manufacturing facilities); TamarNordenberg,
Inside FDA: When a Drug Is in Short Supply, FDA CONSUMER, Nov.-Dec. 1997,
http://www.fda.goviFdac/featurest997/797_drug.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002) ("If shutting
down a plant while the manufacturer corrects problems could lead to a shortage of a medically
necessary drug, the agency may exempt that drug from the ban to keep it available."). When it
recently ordered a recall of processed tissues distributed by CryoLife because of suspected
bacterial contamination, the FDA allowed continuing distribution of heart valves, and it
authorized the resumption of shipments of other critical tissue products even before confirming
that the company had remedied its GMP problems. See Martha Brannigan, CryoLife GainsFDA
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strategies need to give way to some mechanism for paying a premium for
critical pharmaceutical products or at least providing their manufacturers with
generous tax incentives. This Part considers other oft-mentioned solutions to
the scarcity problem in roughly descending order of merit: insulating
manufacturers from tort liability, stockpiling supplies, and nationalizing part
of the industry.
A. Removing the Liability Cloud
As is true with criticisms of excessive regulatory burdens, commentators
usually focus on the disincentives to research and development created by the

threat of tort liability; 5 however, these pressures may also have negative
impacts on the supplies of existing therapeutic products. As Professor Richard
Epstein explained:
[I] f the number of false positives attributed to a vaccine rises
sufficiently, then the private costs imposed upon the
manufacturer diverge from the social costs of the vaccine.
Systematic underproduction results.... If their losses from

the line of production exceed the profits that they can make
6
from the sale of vaccines, then they will leave the market.
Subsequent research confirmed these predicted effects of tort liability on drug
prices and market concentration.

7

Approvalfor Some Sales, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2002, at B6.

85. See. e.g., INST. OF MED., CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 21-23 (Polly
F. Harrison & Allan Rosenfield eds., 1996); Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product
Liabilityon New Drug Development, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON
SAFETY AND INNOVATION 334, 335 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) ("[P]roduct
liability is a serious disincentive to research and development" of drug therapy.); Susan F.
Scharf, Note, Orphan Drugs: The Question of ProductsLiability, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 491, 51213 (1985) (proposing alternatives to address concerns raised by Orphan Drug Act).
86. Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liabilityfor Medical Innovation,8 CARDozO L. REV. 1139,
1154 (1987); see also id. at 1153 ("If in the aggregate the net gains are wiped out by the liability
costs, then the product will no longer be made. If some net gains survive, then fewer units will
be produced to reflect the changes in rules and some marginal consumers must do without.");
Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 285-90 (1985) (expressing concern that product liability risks
will cause stoppage in production of mass-immunization vaccines). See generally STEVEN
GARBER, PRODUCTLIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES
(1993).
87. See Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood
Vaccines, 37 J.L. &ECON. 247,248,254-58,273 (1994); Richard L. Manning, ProductsLiability
and PrescriptionDrug Pricesin Canadaand the United States, 40 J.L. &ECON. 203,234 (1997).
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Tort litigation may drive from the market not only individual
manufacturers of multi-source drugs but also entire product lines." In the case
of the antinauseant drug Bendectin, which the FDA continues to regard as safe
and effective, the manufacturer withdrew the product rather than continue
defending its safety in the courts.89 The withdrawal of this drug two decades
ago left an unmet therapeutic need for pregnant women suffering from severe
nausea, which led to weight loss and dehydration that sometimes necessitated
hospitalization. 90 More recently, in the face of lawsuits and plummeting
demand triggered by the adverse publicity, the manufacturer of a vaccine
against Lyme disease decided to withdraw its FDA-approved product from the
market. 9'

One solution would replace tort liability with alternatives modeled on
workers' compensation programs. As mentioned previously, Congress enacted
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in response to fears of critical
vaccine shortages and dramatic price increases.92 Manufacturers of listed
vaccines must pay an excise tax to fund an administrative compensation
system,93 and the legislation adds procedural and substantive barriers designed

88. See Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturersfor
Failureto Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuitsfrom Driving Good
Drugs Off the Market, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 413, 428-29 (1990); Note, A Question of
Competence: The JudicialRole in the Regulation ofPharmaceuticals,103 HARV. L. REv. 773,
774-75 (1990); Linda A. Johnson, Wyeth Won't Resume NorplantSales, AP ONLINE, July 26,
2002, availableat 2002 WL 24649116; Gina Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill OffNorplant?,N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 3, at 1; Tamar Lewin, Searle, Assailing Lawsuits, Halts US. Sales of
IntrauterineDevices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1986, § 1,at I ("With the company's withdrawal, this
type of birth control device [the IUD] will no longer be available in this country.").
89. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823,824 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Brown
v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) ("Ben[de]ctin, the only antinauseant drug
available for pregnant women, was withdrawn from sale in 1983 because the cost of insurance
almost equalled the entire income from sale of the drug. Before it was withdrawn, the price of
Ben[de]ctin increased by over 300 percent.") (citation omitted); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin
Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle ofMass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 318-19 (1992);
W. Kip Viscusi, CorporateRisk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 547, 584 (2000)
("The risk of juror error coupled with high litigation costs led manufacturers to withdraw
Bendectin from the market notwithstanding the continuing assessment by the FDA and the
scientific community that Bendectin provides benefits exceeding its risks."); see also Lars Noah,
CivilJury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1601, 1656-57 (2001) (noting Bendectin litigation may
impact decisions to market new pregnancy drugs to account for risk of mistaken verdicts).
90. See Gina Kolata, ControversialDrug Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000,
at Fl (adding that a generic version of Bendectin may soon be introduced in the United States
market).
91. See Sole Lyme Vaccine Is Pulled OffMarket, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at C5.
92. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344; Victor E.
Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc
Remedy or a Window for the Future?,48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 388-89, 394 (1987); Mary Beth
Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the
Vaccine Liability Crisis?,63 WASH. L. REv. 149, 150-52, 165 (1988).
93. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131-4132 (2000).
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to discourage tort claims.94 This mechanism appears to have succeeded in
stabilizing prices and stemming further exit from the market," though recent
litigation involving vaccines or injuries not explicitly covered by the program
has shaken manufacturer confidence about the extent of their protection from
liability. 96 Some commentators have proposed similar compensation systems
for other types of drug products,97 or, as happened in the case of the swine flu
vaccine, the federal government could agree to indemnify98manufacturers who
supply products used in a mass-immunization campaign.

94. See Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 269-71 (1995); Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 20 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1994); see also 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2001) (Vaccine Injury Table);
O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 181-82 (1 st Cir. 1996) (rejecting challenges to the agency's
revisions of the Table); Beard v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 43 F.3d 659
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that an injury to a parent was not covered by the Act); Lisa J. Steel,
Note, National Childhood Vaccine Injury CompensationProgram: Is This the Best We Can Do
for Our Children?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 144, 159-71 (1994) (discussing problems with
implementation). See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, ConstructionandApplication
of National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 129 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (analyzing
federal cases adjudicating claims asserted under the Act).
95. See H.R. REP. No. 101-247 (1989), reprintedin 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2235; Edmund W.
Kitch et al., U.S. Law, in VACCINES, supra note 40, at 1165, 1181; Derry Ridgway, No-Fault
Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 59, 76 (1999); see also Edmund L. Andrews, A Major Revival in
Research on Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1990, at D7 (detailing vaccine manufacturers'
efforts to develop new products).
96. See Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("[M]any drug companies now fear that the program
won't shield them from a new wave of lawsuits arising from the rumors of new, unproved,
vaccine complications."); see also Bruce G. Gellin & William Schaffner, Editorial, The Risk of
Vaccination-The Importance of "Negative" Studies, 344 NEw ENG. J. MED. 372 (2001)
(debunking widely publicized claim that Hepatitis B vaccine caused multiple sclerosis); Sandra
Blakeslee, Panel Cautions Against Mercury Preservative,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at A18
(noting concerns about thimerosal used in vaccines).
97. See Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to "No Cause" Liability in Blood
Products Litigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 111-35 (1995); H. William Smith, III, Note,
Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine ManufacturersAgainst Product Liability, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
207, 246-54 (1992); see also Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, PharmaceuticalProductLiability
May Be Hazardousto Your Health: A No-FaultAlternative to ConcurrentRegulation, 42 AM.
U. L. REv. 199, 235-37 (1992) (suggesting such an approach for all drug products).
98. See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat.
1113 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2476 (1976) (repealed 1978)); see also Ducharme v. Merrill-Nat'l
Labs., 574 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 app. (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting constitutional objections to
granting tort immunity to vaccine manufacturers); Thomas E. Baynes, Jr., Liabilityfor Vaccine
Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations and Some Reflections on the Swine Flu
Experience, 21 ST. LouiS U. L.J. 44, 62-74 (1977) (providing background on swine flu epidemic
and analysis of legislative response). This program turned into something of a fiasco. After a
number of vaccine recipients reported developing Guillain-Barre syndrome, the immunization
program ceased, and the tort litigation against the government commenced. See, e.g., Novak v.
United States, 865 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1989) (claiming death from rare disease caused by
vaccine); Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding government derivatively
liable for manufacturer's strict liability for injuries suffered by vaccine recipient); Unthank v.
United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding government strictly liable for
manufacturer's failure to warn vaccine recipient of risk of transverse myelitis); see also Arnold
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A less cumbersome but equally controversial reform would give
pharmaceutical manufacturers the benefit of a regulatory compliance defense.99
A couple of states have enacted legislation designed to limit tort claims against
pharmaceutical products.'
Separately, in response to concerns about
maintaining adequate supplies, all jurisdictions except Vermont exempt blood
from strict products liability.' ' These "blood shield" statutes also protect
commercial suppliers of blood-derived products from strict liability claims.'0 2
Blood suppliers remain subject to tort liability in cases of negligence, although
many courts define the standard of care as the relevant custom in the industry,
making it difficult for plaintiffs to recover.0 3 Even so, recent litigation
W. Reitze, Jr., FederalCompensationfor Vaccination InducedInjuries, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 169, 180-81, 184-85 (1986) (detailing flood of litigation under the Act). The United States
paid out almost $100 million in claims. See David Brown, A Shot in the Dark: Swine Flu's
Vaccine Lessons, WASH. POST, May 27, 2002, at A9.
99. See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147 (2000) (analyzing deficiencies in judicial system in
addressing pharmaceutical problems and proposing regulatory compliance defense); W. Kip
Viscusi et al., DeterringInefficient PharmaceuticalLitigation: An Economic Rationalefor the
FDA Regulatory ComplianceDefense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1478-80 (1994); see also
Carole A. Loflin, Note, Expansion of the Government ContractorDefense: Applying Boyle to
Vaccine Manufacturers, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1261, 1280-96 (1992) (advocating extension of
government contractor defense to DTP vaccine manufacturers).
100. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2000) (treating FDA drug approval
as a conclusive defense absent evidence of fraud), invalidatedby Tayior v. Gate Pharms., 639
N.W.2d 45, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000) (creating a
rebuttable presumption of adequate warning). A handful of other states provide an FDA
compliance defense against only punitive damage claims. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12701(A) (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C) (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.927(1) (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(1) (1996).
101. See Michael J. Miller, Note, Strict Liability,Negligence and the Standardof Carefor
Transfusion-TransmittedDisease, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 473, 488-90 (1994).
102. See McKee v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 866 F.2d 219, 221-22 (6th Cir. 1989); Coffee v.
Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1987); Doe v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 698 F. Supp.
780, 784 (D. Minn. 1988); Rogers v. Miles Labs., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346, 1350-52 (Wash. 1991);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 cmt. c (1998) (noting that
human blood and human tissue, even when provided commercially, are not subject to the rules
of this Restatement.). But see JKB v. Armour Pharm. Co., 660 N.E.2d 602, 605-06 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that the state statute does not protect manufacturers).
103. See Smythe v. Am. Red Cross, 797 F. Supp. 147,152-53 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Kozup v.
Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1055-60 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'din relevantpart, 851 F.2d
437, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ward v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of Am., Inc., 963 P.2d
1031, 1036-37 (Alaska 1998); Spann v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Ctrs., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 364-66
(Ct. App. 1995); Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391,395-400 (Nev. 1993). But see Doe
v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d 375,382-84 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying the defendant's motion
for summary judgment); Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (S.D. W. Va.
1994) (same); Vuono v. N.Y. Blood Ctr., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 743,74748 (D. Mass. 1988) (same);
United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 521-27 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (same);
Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1027-28 (I11.1996) (same). See generally
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability ofBlood Supplier or Donorfor Injury or Death Resulting
from Blood Transfusion, 24 A.L.R.4th 508 (1983 & Supp. 2002) (analyzing state and federal
cases addressing liability for diseases transmitted through blood transfusion).
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involving contaminated blood factor concentrates has created concern about
shortages of a product needed by hemophiliacs. "4
Suppliers of materials used in medical devices have also encountered
litigation that threatened to create scarcity problems. For instance, recipients of
defectively designed temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants sued DuPont,
the supplier of the raw material used in the devices, after the finished product

manufacturer went bankrupt. The company ultimately prevailed in all of the
TMJ lawsuits filed against it.'0 5 However, DuPont expended significant
resources for its string of victories during the decade that this litigation lasted,
10 6
paying far more in legal fees than it ever earned on this minor application.
Similarly, when the largest manufacturer of silicone-gel breast implants filed
for bankruptcy protection after numerous products liability claims," 7 plaintiffs'
lawyers began pursuing Dow Chemical as the supplier of the raw silicone. 8
Dow Chemical usually prevailed, and the lawsuits filed against other suppliers
of silicone to other manufacturers of breast implants have not succeeded. 9
Even so, spooked by these lawsuits, Dow discontinued supplying silicone for
other important medical device applications such as hydrocephalus shunts," 0
and other biomaterials companies refused to supply implant manufacturers with
essential components.1

104. See Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of Market Share
Liability in Blood ProductsLitigation, 68 TuL. L. REV. 883, 918-22 (1994); Eric Nauenberg &
Sean D. Sullivan, FirmBehavior in the U.S. Marketfor Factor VIII: A NeedforPolicy?,39 Soc.
SCI. &MED. 1591, 1591-94 (1994).
105. See In re TMJ Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1056-59 (8th Cir. 1996)
(collecting cases); Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.
1995); LaMontagne v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 846, 857-60 (2d Cir. 1994).
106. See Gary Taylor, A Discovery by DuPont: Hidden Costs of Winning, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
27, 1995, at B 1 (reporting one estimate that the company had spent more than $40 million
defending itself).
107. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 551-54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
108. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 106, 113-24 (Nev. 1998)
(upholding a compensatory damage award of $4.2 million, but reversing punitive damage award
of $10 million), overruled in partsub. nom. GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
109. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F. Supp. 1110, 1112-17
(N.D. Ala. 1997); Artiglio v. Gen. Elec. Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817, 822-23 (Ct. App. 1998); see
also White v. Weiner, 562 A.2d 378, 385-86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (upholding summary
judgment for a company that had supplied bulk active ingredient to another company that
manufactured a prescription drug implicated in a patient's death).
110. See BIOMATERIALS AVAILABILITY: POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON MEDICAL INNOVATION AND
HEALTH CARE, ISSUE PAPER NO. 194, at 17, 32 (Rand Sci. & Tech. Pol'y Inst. ed., 2000).
111. See H.R. REP. No. 105-549, at 10 (1998); Frederick D. Baker, Effects of Products
Liability on Bulk Suppliers of Biomaterials, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 455, 458 & n.21 (1995);
Robert F. Service, Liability Concerns ThreatenMedicalImplantResearch, 266 SCIENCE 726,726
(1994); Bamaby J. Feder, Implant Industry Is Facing Cutback by Top Suppliers, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1994, at A l; John Stossel, Protect Us From Legal Vultures, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1996,
at 8 (noting that fears of liability caused the primary supplier of a special type of polyethylene
used in artificial joints to stop selling the material to implant manufacturers).
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In response to fears of an emerging shortage of raw materials needed to
make lifesaving medical devices, Congress enacted the Biomaterials Access
Assurance Act of 1998.'2 Under this statute, a biomaterials supplier that
neither manufactured nor sold the allegedly defective implant would face tort
liability only if it "failed to meet applicable contractual requirements or
specifications" when it furnished raw materials or component parts." 3 When
named in a lawsuit as a co-defendant, the biomaterials supplier receives certain
procedural benefits, including protection from sweeping discovery requests and
an opportunity to seek an expedited dismissal with prejudice, or summary
judgment, if the plaintiff cannot establish that the supplier also made or sold the
implant, or furnished nonconforming biomaterials. 4 It remains to be seen
whether this legislation adequately reassures biomaterials suppliers, but the law
provides still another model for responding to concerns that unpredictable tort
litigation will cause additional shortages of critical pharmaceuticals in the
future.
B. Stockpiling Reservesfor a Rainy Day
The creation of emergency stockpiles represents another response to the
threat of shortages"' much like the strategic petroleum reserve established after
the OPEC oil embargo." 6 In 1982, the federal government began stockpiling
childhood vaccines." 7 On a number of occasions, the CDC has tapped into this

112. Pub. L. No. 105-230, 112 Stat. 1519 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606 (2000)).
113. See 21 U.S.C. § 1604. The statute expressly preempts contrary state law. Id.
§ 1603(c).
114. See id. § 1605. The biomaterials supplier remains subject to impleader, but only if the
claimant or device manufacturer can persuade the trial judge that the negligence or intentionally
tortious conduct of the previously dismissed biomaterials supplier caused the harm and that the
manufacturer cannot or should not shoulder the full amount ofany tortjudgment. See id. § 1606;
see also Medical Devices Draft Guidance for the Implementation of the Biomaterials Access
Assurance Act of 1998; Availability, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,562 (Apr. 2, 2001) (announcing the
availability of a draft guidance for implementing a procedure to petition the FDA for a
declaration concerning a biomaterials supplier's compliance with establishment registration
requirements); Anne Marie Murphy, Note, The BiomaterialsAccess Assurance Act of 1998 and
SupplierLiability: Who You Gonna Sue?, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 715, 738 (2000) (explaining that
major suppliers remain unconvinced that the statute will afford them meaningful protection).
115. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 991 ("Another alternative for improving
supply reliability is stockpiling of vaccines to prepare for a possible substantial supply
interruption.").
116. See Kenneth Bredemeier, Will Oil Be Cut OffAgain?, WASH. POST, May 16, 2002, at
El ("[O]il-consuming nations today have amassed strategic petroleum reserves that now total
1.2 billion barrels of crude, led by 566 million barrels of oil in U.S. reserves stored in Louisiana
and Texas.").
117. See Mowery & Mitchell, supranote 9, at 991 ("[T]he U.S. government contracts with
vaccine manufacturers for a vaccine storage and rotation agreement to maintain a
twenty-four-week inventory of selected vaccines (tetanus-diphtheria, diphtheria-tetanus,
inactivated polio vaccine, OPV, DTP, and MMR)."); Peggy J. Naile, Note, TortLiabilityforDPT
Vaccine Injury andthe Preemption Doctrine, 22 IND. L. REv. 655, 693 (1989) (explaining that,
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reserve to cover temporary shortfalls caused by production difficulties.,"
Although the agency continues to maintain the stockpile at its original levels,
the program has stagnated somewhat in the face of resource constraints."1 9
More recently, the federal government created a National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile (NPS) of a range of drugs designed for rapid deployment in the event
of public health emergencies. 20 When bioterrorism emerged as a threat to
civilians, some feared shortages of antibiotics effective in the treatment of
anthrax. 21 In addition, the relatively few remaining doses of the vaccine for
smallpox, a disease eradicated decades earlier, triggered research into the
possibility of diluting available supplies to stretch the doses while
manufacturers ramped up production under government contracts to purchase

after a shortage of DPT vaccine in 1984, the CDC undertook to stockpile a six-month supply)
(citations omitted).
118. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 991 ("Since its inception, the stockpile has
been used seven times.") (citation omitted).
119. See id. ("Congressional funding for the vaccine stockpile ended in 1991. Although
the existing twenty-four-week stockpile of the six vaccines previously listed has been
maintained, no new [types of] vaccines ... have been stockpiled, leaving them vulnerable to
supply interruptions."); id. ("The stockpile of MMR is maintained at a twelve-week level, and
that for DTP also is less than the six-month level, because the CDC does not wish to replenish
the stockpile with outmoded products.").
The stockpiling program mandated by Congress in 1982 provides relatively
inexpensive insurance against supply interruptions but requires more stable
funding and expansion to cover new vaccines. Improved vaccine supply
assurance policies also will rely on more accurate forecasts of vaccine
demand and timely information on conditions of supply and stockpiles.
See also id. at 999.
120.
See Nat'l Ctr. Envtl.
Health, CDC, NPS Synopsis,
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/nceh/nps/synopses.htm (last visited May 21,2002); see alsoU.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-0 1-463, COMBATING TERRORISM: ACCOUNTABILITY OVER MEDICAL
SUPPLIES NEEDS FURTHER IMPROVEMENT (assessing risks and making recommendations
concerning medical supplies in the event of a biological or chemical terrorist incident); Reed
Abelson & Robert Pear, ConcernsAbout How Quickly the US. Can Deliver Drugs,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2001, at B8 ("The government's rapid response plan relies on eight so-called push
packages, which are pre-assembled sets that contain 84 or more different medical supplies,
ranging from antibiotics to intravenous supplies.... [E]ach 50-ton set is stored in an undisclosed
location around the country .... "); cf Scott Hensley & Ron Winslow, Drug Companies
Contemplate New Role as "Biodefense Contractors," WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at BI
(discussing potential for drug companies' "new relationship" with government).
121. See Weiss, supra note 1, at A24; see also Ron Brookmeyer & Natalie Blades,
Prevention ofInhalationalAnthrax in the U.S. Outbreak,295 SCIENCE 1861 (2002) (concluding
that prophylactic use of antibiotics helps limit the number of cases).
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300 million doses. 22 The CDC has added both products to the NPS, 123 and it
also has purchased a large supply of potassium iodide, a drug that provides
12 4
some protection against thyroid damage from radioactive fallout.
Stockpiles offer a stopgap measure for covering limited shortfalls in
supply, but they do not address the underlying causes of scarcity.12 They also
present serious logistical difficulties that limit their usefulness. Moreover,
resource constraints make it unlikely that the federal government would ever
manage to establish-much less maintain-a truly comprehensive selection of
critical pharmaceuticals for a sizeable patient population. Instead, drug
stockpiles will play an increasingly important but still limited role as part of an
emergency response strategy.
C. Compulsory Licensing as an Antidote?
An even more radical strategy calls for active public sector involvement in
the production of critical pharmaceuticals. 2 6 Compulsory licensing, which

122. See Rachel Zimmerman, Merck, GlaxoSmithKline Are Front-Runners to Produce
Smallpox Vaccine for the US., WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 2, 2001, at A9. Researchers concluded that
diluted vaccine would confer immunity. See Sharon E. Frey et al., Clinical Responses to
Undiluted andDilutedSmallpox Vaccine, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1265, 1267 (2002). However,
the government has not begun to stockpile an antiviral drug approved for use in AIDS patients
even though it may help treat smallpox cases. Marilyn Chase, MedicalDebate Keeps U S.from
Stockpiling Smallpox Treatment, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 19, 2002, at A24.
123. See M.A.J. McKenna, Bioterrorism War Changes CDCRole, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Mar. 23, 2002, at 1A ("Since last fall, enough antibiotics to treat 12 million potential cases of
anthrax for 60 days have been added to the stockpile. By the end of this year, enough smallpox
vaccine to protect the entire country also will be included."); see also Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, tit. I(B), 116 Stat.
594 (including small pox in the stockpile); Robert Pear, Legislation; Negotiators Reach
Compromise on Measure to Strengthen Safeguards Against Bioterror,N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2002, at A24 (explaining that Congress crafted this legislation to defend against bioterrorism in
part by "expand[ing] government stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines").
124. See Justin Gillis, US. Says It Bought Radiation Drug, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2002, at
A5.
125. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 991 ("In contrast to a preventive strategy
to develop more sources of supply for a specific vaccine by encouraging entry, stockpiling is a
remedial policy, designed to address supply interruptions once they occur.").
Stockpiling cannot resolve the consequences of a truly catastrophic supply
interruption, such as the complete destruction of a sole-source production
facility, because of the limited shelf life of vaccines and the lengthy time
needed to license a new production plant. Stockpiling is an important
component of a broader strategy to ensure the vaccine supply, one that
includes steps to prevent supply interruptions and to address the
consequences of a long interruption of supply of a single-source vaccine.
Id. at 992; see also id. at 993, 998 (explaining the infeasibility of large emergency procurements
from foreign sources).
126. See Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("Other possibilities [for averting future shortages]
include the creation of a 'National Vaccine Authority' that would help oversee vaccine
development, and the construction of a government-owned, contractor-opcrated production plant.
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forces a patent holder to allow the use of an invention by others in exchange for
a fixed royalty, offers one mechanism for doing so, and some commentators
have suggested patent buyouts by the federal government as a mechanism for
127
controlling price and availability problems with critical drug products.
However, with limited exceptions the United States does not subject
pharmaceuticals to compulsory licensing.
In the case of orphan drugs, manufacturers receive an extended period of
market exclusivity, but a provision for compulsory licensing in the event of
supply shortages is also included.121 In addition, pursuant to federal technology
transfer laws,' 29 the government enjoys a limited right to call for compulsory
licensing of inventions developed with its assistance: it retains so-called
"march in" rights that allow it to revoke a previously granted exclusive license
if the licensee fails to make a covered invention available to the public. 3 '
Finally, although the United States does not have separate legislation
authorizing compulsory licensing of patents for pharmaceutical products, the
Tucker Act provides a right of action for the unlicensed use of a patent by the

(These two ideas enjoy little support in the pharmaceutical industry.)"); Jon Cohen & Eliot
Marshall, Should the Government Make Vaccines?, TECH. REv., May 2002, at 39, 40-42
(discussing same).
127. See Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward Allocative Efficiency in the
Prescription Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q. 213, 221-25 (1995); Michael Kremer, Patent
Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1163-64 (1998);
Evan Ackiron, Note, Patentsfor CriticalPharmaceuticals: The AZT Case, 17 AM. J.L. & MED.
145, 177-80 (1991).
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(1) (2000).
129. Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, private entities may commercialize breakthroughs
supported by government funding. See Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)); see also Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Inst., 787 F.
Supp. 360, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining Bayh-Dole Act's application to non-profits), aff'd
mem., 983 F.2d 1086 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, PublicResearch and
Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-SponsoredResearch,
82 VA. L. REv. 1663 (1996) (examining Bayh-Dole Act's impact on biomedical research). Under
the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 2, 100 Stat. 1785-1787
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a)(1), (b)(2)-(3) (2000)), agencies could enter into cooperative
research and developments agreements (CRADAs), assigning to private entities the patents for
any inventions developed in collaboration with government researchers. Until 1995, the NIH
imposed a "reasonable pricing" requirement on products that emerged from a CRADA, which
it dropped in the wake of criticism that this amounted to the imposition of price controls. See
Baruch Brody, PublicGoods andFairPrices: BalancingTechnologicalInnovationwith Social
Well-Being, HASTINGS CTR.REP., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 5, 6.

130. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 201(0, 203 (2000); Peter S. Amo & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't
We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable
Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Partfrom Federally
Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REv. 631, 647, 659-66 (2001); Barbara M. McGarey & Annette
C. Levey, Patents,Products,and PublicHealth: An Analysis of the CellProMarch-InPetition,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1099, 1115 (1999).
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federal government.13 To the dismay of the pharmaceutical industry, the
government threatened to use this authority in order to acquire inexpensive
supplies of the antibiotic Cipro (ciprofloxacin) for treating persons exposed to
anthrax. 132

Several industrialized countries used to have limited compulsory licensing
rules applicable to medical technologies either where necessary to combat a
threat to public health or after a period of nonuse by the patent holder. 33 In
1993, Canada discontinued its practice of routine compulsory licensing as a
mechanism for controlling the prices of pharmaceuticals, 3 4 though it remains
available as an option for public health emergencies. 135 For drugs patented after
May 15, 1997, the World Trade Organization (WTO) appears to prohibit
routine compulsory licensing, but in case of a national emergency, a signatory
may authorize compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceuticals to protect the
36
public health. 1

131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000); Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 157576, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In contrast, a few federal statutes provide for compulsory licensing

of patents under limited circumstances in other areas. See 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2000); 30 U.S.C.
§ 666 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000). In rare instances, courts may
refuse to enjoin infringement by private parties where the patent holder withholds a license to
use the invention in a way that would promote the public health. See Vitamin Technologists, Inc.
v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941,945-47 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding invalid patents
for a process of using irradiation to fortify margarine with vitamin D to combat rickets, but
adding that, even if valid, it would not have enjoined the infringing use), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
876 (1945).
132. See Chea, supra note 47, at El. The government previously has used this power to
procure certain needed drugs such as the antibiotic tetracycline from sources other than the
patent holder or its licensees. See MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND
POLITICS 186-87 (1974); see also Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 535, 536 (Ct.
Cl. 1974) (meprobamate tranquilizer).
133. See Reed Boland, RU486 in FranceandEngland: CorporateEthics and Compulsory
Licensing, 20 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 226, 230 (1992).

134. See Patent Act Amendment Act, 1992, ch.2, § 3 S.C. 11 (Can.); see also Sheldon
Burshtein, Sublicense or Supply Agreement? Supreme Court of CanadaInterpretationBenefits
GenericPharmaceuticalIndustry, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 73, 74-75 (1999) (noting elimination
of compulsory licensing scheme for medicine); Mary Atkinson,Comment, PatentProtectionfor
Pharmaceuticals: A ComparativeStudy of the Law in the United States and Canada, 11 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 181, 191-92 (2002) (NAFTA Bill C-29 eliminated compulsory licensing);
Christopher Scott Harrison, Comment, Protectionof Pharmaceuticalsas ForeignPolicy: The
Canada-U.S.TradeAgreement andBill C-22 Versus the North American Free TradeAgreement
andBill C-91, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 457, 505-25 (2001) (explaining Canada's history
of compulsory licensing and C-91's amendment of the patent system).
135. See Shankar Vedantam & Terence Chea, DrugFirm Plays Defense in Anthrax Scare:
ForNow, U.S. Declines to Suspend Bayer's Patent andAuthorize Generic Cipro, WASH. POST,
Oct. 20, 2001, at A4 (reporting that Canada had invoked its compulsory licensing authority for
this antibiotic).
136. See Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights Agreement, art. 31; see also
Sara M. Ford, Comment, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement:
BalancingPillsand Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941,959-67 (2000) (outlining compulsory
licensing conditions and ambiguities in TRIPs Article 31); Susan Vastano Vaughan, Note,
Compulsory Licensing ofPharmaceuticalsUnder TRIPS: What StandardofCompensation?,25
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Of course, to the extent that many of the shortages involve products
lacking patent protection, the government need not exercise eminent domain
power. Some commentators have suggested even more aggressive government
involvement in producing critical drugs, but past experience with public control
of vaccine manufacturing suggests caution. Early in the nineteenth century, in
response to concerns about the sale of fake smallpox vaccine, Congress
established an office responsible for providing genuine supplies, but it repealed
the law less than a decade later after an outbreak of smallpox linked to doses
from this federal vaccine agent.' A century and a half later, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) faced criticism for authorizing the release of subpotent doses of polio vaccine, which some commentators ascribed to a conflict
of interest arising from the government's commitment to widespread
vaccination.' The public health departments in a couple of states produce their
own supplies of certain childhood vaccines,139 but doing this for numerous
critical pharmaceuticals on a national scale seems both impractical and
inadvisable.
In 1992, the Institute of Medicine recommended the creation of a "surge"
production capacity for critical vaccines under public ownership,' 40 and it

HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.

L. REV. 87, 96-100 (2001) (detailing TRIPs Article 31 compulsory
licensing). The WTO eventually may authorize compulsory licensing of patented drugs for the
treatment of a broad range of serious diseases. See Celia W. Dugger, A Catch-22 on Drugsfor
the World's Poor: The Right to Make Generics, but Not the Means to Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 2001, at W1; Geoff Winestock & Helene Cooper, Activists Outmaneuver Drug Makers at
WTO, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2001, at A2.
137. See An Act to Encourage Vaccination, ch. 37,2 Stat. 806 (1813), repealedby An Act
to Repeal the Act, Entitled "An Act to Encourage Vaccination," ch. 50, 3 Stat. 677 (1822); H.R.
REP. No. 17-93 (1822).
138. See Nicholas Wade, Division of Biologics Standards: Scientific Management
Questioned, 175 SCIENCE 966, 967 (1972) (reporting allegations that "management has
suppressed or ignored scientific findings that would adversely affect the vaccine market");
Nicholas Wade, Division of Biologics Standards: The Boat That Never Rocked, 175 SCIENCE
1225, 1230 (1972) ("[F]ederal responsibility for vaccine development should be clarified, in a
way that ensures the DBS does not develop vaccines in-house."); see also Berkovitz v. United
States, 486 U.S. 531, 542-48 (1988) (reviewing lawsuit brought against the NIH and FDA
alleging negligence in licensing and releasing lots of oral polio vaccine); In re Sabin Oral Polio
Vaccine Prods. Liab. Litig., 984 F.2d 124, 125-28 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the
government had unjustifiably failed to implement the applicable requirements).
139. See Mowery & Mitchell, supranote 9, at 981-83 tbl.2, 995 (noting that Massachusetts
and Michigan make DTP vaccines); Stephen Smith, State Plans a $77MLabfor Vaccines, New
Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al.
140. See INST. OF MED., EMERGING INFECTIONS: MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH IN THE
UNITED STATES 10-12, 150-59 (1992); see also INST. OF MED., THE CHILDREN'S VACCINE
INITIATIVE: ACHIEVING THE VISION (Violaine S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1993) (elaborating). The

1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act had included provisions designed to promote
vaccine innovation and production. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- 1 to -6 (2000); Alan R. Hinman, The
National Vaccine Programand the National Vaccine Injury CompensationProgram,44 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 633, 633-34 (1989); see also Rachel Nowak, US. NationalProgramIs Going
Nowhere Fast,265 SCIENCE 1375 (1994) (criticizing the National Vaccine Program); Phillip K.
Russell, Development of Vaccines to Meet Public Health Needs: Incentives and Obstacles, 7

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

31

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 371

reiterated this proposal shortly after the latest terrorist attacks.1 4 ' However,
some commentators have questioned the wisdom of undertaking such an effort:
"The costs of establishing a publicly operated standby facility in the United
States to provide a secure source of domestic supply are so high, and the
resulting facility so limited to specific vaccines, that any such step would be
unwise."'4 2 As with bulk purchasing to create stockpiles, direct government
involvement in the production of vaccines and other critical pharmaceuticals
is unlikely to succeed on more than a very limited scale. Instead of trying to
displace private manufacturers, the federal government should ensure that
market conditions are conducive to the production of ample supplies by
multiple sources.
IV. CONCLUSION

For a variety of reasons, shortages of vaccines and other critical
pharmaceutical products have increased in the last few years. Pressures
emanating from regulatory agencies, courts, and insurers have conspired to
make this line of the pharmaceutical business less than attractive. The FDA's
implementation of GMP requirements, especially those governing the
production ofvaccines and other biologics, have created compliance difficulties
for manufacturers; the threat of tort liability continues to drive some drug
companies from particular markets; and cost-containment pressures resulting
from bulk government purchases or declining levels of insurance
reimbursement have eroded profit margins. Under these conditions, the
pharmaceutical industry's focus on "blockbuster" drugs for lifestyle uses or
chronic health conditions should come as no great surprise.

RISK 239 (1996) (discussing the Children's Vaccine Initiative and the public health system).
141. See Council of the Institute of Medicine, Statement on Vaccine Development, Nov.
5,2001, http://www.iom.edu/iom/iomhome.nsf/pages/vaccine+development (last visited Oct. 3,
2002); BioterrorismRisks: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Nat 'l
Sec., Veterans' Affairs and
InternationalRelations of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony
of Kenneth I. Shine, President, Institute of Medicine).
142. Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 995; see also id. at 995 ("Cost and feasibility
are the key disadvantages of any publicly financed, publicly owned vaccine production facility
that could be pressed into service in the event of a catastrophic supply interruption."). Mowery
and Mitchell note:
[IOM] estimated the capital costs alone of a vaccine development and pilot
production facility to be $30 million to $75 million. The capital costs of a
full-scale production facility would undoubtedly be higher, and to these
costs we must add those associated with operation and establishment
licensure. Moreover, the costs of a multiproduct facility would be higher
still.
ld.; see also id. ("[G]aining and retaining an FDA establishment license for vaccine production
requires the continuous production of test lots. Thus a licensed standby facility is feasible only
if it is nothing of the kind. Any standby facility would have to be engaged in the regular
production of vaccines ....).
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This is a multifaceted problem that does not admit to any single or simple
solution, but the government should not respond in ways that further weaken
market incentives. Instead, it should try to encourage private manufacturers to
continue supplying critical pharmaceutical products. A number of steps would
help improve the business climate: more flexible regulation of manufacturing
facilities, greater protection from the vagaries of tort liability, and the
avoidance of excessive cost controls. In addition, the government should
bolster its emergency stockpiles, but it must take care to avoid suggestions that
the public sector should take over the entire operation. If it did, as a single
supplier it would risk many of the same shortcomings that government-run
monopolies have encountered in other fields.
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